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ABSTRACT
We develop a tax competition framework in which some jurisdictions, called tax havens, are
parasitic on the revenues of other countries. The havens use real resources to help companies
camouflage their home-country tax avoidance, and countries use resources in an attempt to limit the
transfer of tax revenues to the havens. The equilibrium price for this service depends on the demand
and supply for such protection. Recognizing that taxes on wage income are also evaded, we solve
for the equilibrium tax rates on mobile capital and immobile labor, and we demonstrate that the full
or partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries, in part because
countries would be induced to increase their tax rates, which they have set at inefficiently low levels
in an attempt to attract mobile capital. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to
become tax havens, and we show that the abolishment of a sufficiently small number of the relatively
large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens.
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1. Introduction 
Although there is no universally accepted definition, OECD (1998) provides a useful 
definition of a tax haven as a jurisdiction that imposes no or only nominal taxes itself and offers 
itself as a place to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of residence.  A tax 
haven can offer this service because it has laws or administrative practices that prevent the 
effective exchange of information on taxpayers benefiting from the low-tax jurisdiction.
1  In this 
paper, we refer to the intent of such jurisdictions as being “parasitic” on the tax revenues of the 
non-haven countries.    Our purpose is to develop a theory of tax havens and tax competition that 
explains why countries are, and should be, concerned about the detrimental effects of havens on 
their citizen’s welfare.   
Policy actions by OECD countries reflect this concern. Before the 1998 OECD report, 
action against tax havens was predominantly unilateral, as exemplified by the introduction in 
1962 of the U.S. Subpart F provisions that addressed so-called passive income earned in tax 
haven countries and not distributed to the United States.
2  Later many OECD countries enacted 
domestic tax rules designed to lessen the attractiveness of tax avoidance and evasion though tax 
havens. 
The OECD report concludes that “governments cannot stand back while their tax bases 
are eroded through the actions of countries which offer taxpayers ways to exploit tax havens [and 
preferential regimes] to reduce the tax that would otherwise be payable to them.” (p. 37).   It 
offers a long list of recommendations concerning domestic legislation, tax treaties, and 
international cooperation.  In the last category is a recommendation to produce a list of tax-haven 
countries that would enable non-haven countries to coordinate their responses to the problems 
                                                 
1 The OECD report distinguished tax havens from cases in which countries that raise significant revenues from the 
income tax but have preferential tax regimes for certain kinds of income, generally restricted to non-residents. 
2 This history is recounted in Eden and Kudrle (2005).   3
created by the havens and to “encourage these jurisdictions to reexamine their policies.” (p. 57)  
In 2000, the OECD followed up by publishing the names of 35 countries called “non-cooperating 
tax havens,” which were given one year to enact fundamental reform of their tax systems and 
broaden the exchange of information with tax authorities or face economic sanctions.  By 2005, 
almost all of the blacklisted tax havens had signed the OECD’s Memorandum of Understanding 
agreeing to transparency and exchange of information.
 3 
Notably, the 35 designated tax havens are invariably small.  Their average population is 
284,000, and is 116,000 if one excludes the only two designated countries (Liberia and Panama) 
whose population exceeds one million.  Although the 35 tax havens represent over 15 percent of 
the world’s countries, their total population comprises just 0.150 percent of the world’s 
population (0.058 percent excluding Liberia and Panama).  Of the 35 designated tax havens, 27 
are island nations.
4 
In sharp contrast to the longstanding concern about the deleterious effects of havens, 
recent normative economic theory has focused on a potentially beneficial role for tax havens.   
The starting point is the well-known result that, under certain conditions, a small, open economy 
should levy no distorting tax on mobile factors such as capital.  The intuition behind this result is 
straightforward.   All taxes levied in this economy will ultimately be borne by the immobile 
factors.  Given that, it is better to levy taxes directly on the immobile factors; attempting to tax 
the mobile factors will not change the incidence but will, unlike taxes levied directly on the 
immobile factors, drive away the mobile capital, thus reducing the productivity and therefore the 
                                                 
3 Public U.S. support for the OECD initiative flagged after 2000, as exemplified by statements by the Secretary of 
the Treasury suggesting that the U.S. government was no longer committed to fighting the tax havens.    In addition, 
some other OECD countries such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, have haven-like aspects of their own tax 
systems, and several other member countries privilege certain tax havens through double tax treaties and other 
preferential tax regimes.  (Eden and Kudrle 2005, p. 123). 
4 Hines (2005) presents more information about tax havens, and analyses their recent economic performance.   4
pre-tax return to the immobile factors.  See Gordon (1986) and Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) 
for demonstrations that small open economies should not levy distorting source-based taxes. 
Countries do, however, levy distorting taxes on mobile capital.  Much of the recent 
theoretical literature conceives of tax havens as a device to save these countries from themselves, 
by providing them with a way to move toward the non-distorting tax regime they should, but for 
some reason cannot explicitly, enact.
5  For example, in Hong and Smart (2005), citizens of high-
tax countries can benefit from haven-related tax planning because it allows them to tax domestic 
entrepreneurs (in a lump-sum way) without driving away mobile multinational capital.  The 
haven exists only as a construct allowing the parent to borrow from the low-tax affiliate and 
deduct the interest; the interest received by the haven affiliate is tax-free.  The presence of the 
haven reduces the (distorting) effective marginal tax rate for any given statutory tax rate.   
Peralta, Wauthy, and van Ypersele (2003) also assume that countries cannot directly 
discriminate the rate of profit taxation of mobile and immobile firms, but a government may 
optimally decide not to enforce the arm’s length principle of transfer pricing in order to host a 
multinational firm while setting high profit taxes on domestic firms.   Similarly, Becker and 
Fuest (2005) demonstrate that if immobile and mobile firms must be taxed at the same rate, then 
the government may wish to alter other aspects of the tax code to reduce the effective taxation of 
the mobile firms, including the use of a pure profits tax and the degree to which capital costs are 
tax deductible.   
                                                 
5 A separate literature examines the issue of whether countries would benefit from international agreements that 
potentially lessen tax competition by restricting the degree to which countries can provide preferential tax treatment 
to relatively mobile factors.  The results are mixed.  See Janeba and Peters (1999), Keen (2001), Janeba and Smart 
(2003)  Wilson (2005), and Bucovetsky and Haufler (2005).  Most recently, Marceau, Mongrain, and Wilson (2006) 
demonstrate that rules against preferential treatment enable small countries to compete away mobile capital from 
larger countries, but that non-preferential regimes are still preferable. 
   5
The idea that countries should welcome tax havens as a way to overcome their inability 
to explicitly differentiate the effective tax rate on mobile and immobile capital flies in the face of 
the fact that governments of non-haven countries often expend considerable resources to limit 
the effect of haven transactions on their own tax revenue.  It suggests that these countries do not 
view havens as a way to overcome exogenous, perhaps politically-motivated, constraints on their 
tax policy.  
This paper develops a model of tax competition in the presence of parasitic tax havens 
that explains and justifies existing initiatives to limit haven activities.   As should be expected, 
tax havens lead to the wasteful expenditure of resources, both by firms in their participation in 
havens and by governments in their attempts to enforce their tax codes.  In addition, tax havens 
worsen tax competition problems by causing countries to further reduce their tax rates below 
levels that are efficient from the viewpoint of all countries combined.  Either full or partial 
elimination of havens is found to be welfare-improving.  Indeed, initiatives to limit some, but not 
all, havens can be designed to leave all countries better off, including the remaining havens.  To 
demonstrate this last possibility, we model the decision to become a haven and, in so doing, 
demonstrate that small countries have a greater incentive to become havens. 
Our model is designed to capture the role in the world economy of the small, mostly, 
island economies that act as tax havens.  For this reason we do not develop a model of 
symmetric, identical countries, but rather a model in which some countries act as havens and 
other countries do not—the former are parasitic on the revenues of the latter, in a way we make 
explicit.  Second, we model the real resources that are used up as companies camouflage their tax 
avoidance and evasion operations and high-tax governments attempt to limit the transfer of 
revenues to the havens.  To address this issue, we model tax havens as juridical entrepreneurs   6
that sell protection from national taxation, resulting in what Palan (2002) calls the 
“commercialization of state sovereignty.”  The equilibrium price for this service depends on the 
demand for such protection, which in turn depends on the tax system, including the resources 
devoted to tax enforcement by the non-haven countries, and on the technology available to the 
parasitic havens.   
As noted above, the degree to which countries choose to tax mobile capital relative to 
immobile factors is critical to arguments that tax havens may be beneficial.   Standard tax 
competition models do not adequately confront this issue, because they typically assume that 
only the tax on mobile capital is endogenously determined.  In contrast, our analysis addresses 
this issue directly by assuming that tax evasion is also a problem in the collection of taxes on 
immobile labor.  In this manner, we justify a role for capital taxation in a small, open economy.     
In addition to examining restrictions on the number of havens, we explicitly model the 
decentralized use of enforcement activities.    The notion that tax enforcement policy is a 
separate instrument of tax policy that can play a role in tax competition has been recognized in 
the work of Cremer and Gahvari (1997, 2000).   An important insight from this work is that each 
country has an incentive to enforce its tax base suboptimally, because the resulting reduction in 
the effective tax rate causes more of the mobile tax base to locate within its borders.    Whereas 
this result may also hold in the current model, we explicitly examine the mix of statutory rates 
and enforcement levels used to finance a given public good level.  Our conclusion is that 
countries would be better off if they agreed to increase their tax rates and lower enforcement.   
Doing so would raise the demand for the evasion-facilitating services from tax havens, which 
would raise the effective price of these services and thereby discourage tax evasion.   Countries   7
fail to take into account this “cost externality” when choosing how vigorously to enforce their 
tax codes.   
The plan of this paper is as follows.   We develop the model in the next section, and then 
devote Section 3 to deriving the equilibrium tax policies for each country.  Section 4 
demonstrates that eliminating tax havens raises public good levels and improves welfare.    The 
partial elimination of havens is addressed in Section 5, and Section 6 analyzes inefficiencies in 
tax enforcement activities.  In Section 7, the model is extended to include the endogenous 
determination of the number of tax havens.  Section 8 concludes.  
  
2.  The Model 
  We extend a standard model of tax competition to include tax havens.
6    The economy 
contains of a large number of countries, each containing a fixed number of identical residents, Li 
for country i.  Each resident possesses one unit of labor and k* units of capital.   The utility 
function is denoted u(x, g), where x is private consumption and g is consumption of a publicly-
provided private good, both of which are normal goods.  For brevity, we refer to the latter good 
as the “public good.”   
The capital employed by country i is Ki,  with Ki – k*Li  representing imports of capital. 
Competitive firms use a constant-returns technology to transform these inputs into a single 
output.   This output is sold to consumers in the form of the private consumption good, and to the 
government for use as the sole input in the production of the public good.  Taxes on immobile 
labor and mobile capital are used to finance the public good.  Although countries differ in size, 
we will specify a constant-returns technology for collecting and evading taxes that yields 
equilibrium tax policies that are independent of country size.   
                                                 
6 See Wilson (1999) for a review of the tax competition literature.   8
The taxation of capital takes the form of a territorial tax on “taxable business income,” 
defined below.  In particular, each government taxes only the capital income earned within its 
borders.
7   This assumption is standard in the tax competition literature, and reflects the 
difficulties that home countries face in effectively taxing foreign-source income.    
In standard models that feature perfect competition and constant returns to scale in 
production, the number of competitive firms is typically indeterminate and irrelevant.   For the 
present case, however, we wish to model tax avoidance at the firm level.   Consequently, we 
assume that investors create firms using one unit of capital per firm, and then these firms hire 
labor and decide how much income to shelter in tax havens.  Each firm has access to the same 
production technology and therefore employs the same labor and produces the same output.  
Firms differ, however, in the cost of setting up operations in a tax haven, as described by a 
parameter, θ.   
We assume that firms purchase from tax havens “services” that facilitate the concealment 
of taxable income.  The mechanism through which the havens facilitate tax avoidance is left 
unspecified.  The unit price of concealment services, p, is a function of worldwide purchases of 
these services, C.  In other words, there is a well-defined inverse supply function for 
concealment services, p = p(C), which may be infinitely elastic or upward-sloping.   An 
interpretation is that there are many “competitive” havens, each of which prices its services at 
marginal cost.
8   
                                                 
7 This assumption allows us to sidestep the question of whether havens can benefit capital-exporting countries by 
reducing the tax collected by host countries, letting the home country collect more revenue for any given excess 
burden.  See Hines and Rice (1994) for an elaboration of this argument. 
8 Note that this specification may be interpreted more generally by assuming that the production of concealment 
services requires the use of not just a tax haven, but also the aid of “accountant services” located in a firm’s country 
of residence.    More formally, one could posit a production process whereby accountant and haven services serve as 
intermediate inputs in the production of concealment services.   If there were constant costs in the provision of 
accountant services (to abstract from issues related to country size, which do not seem important in this context), 
then all countries will face the same world supply curve for concealment services.      9
For now, we treat the number of jurisdictions that are tax havens as exogenously fixed.   
If a country is not a tax haven, then it is simply referred to as “a country.”   Section 7 
endogenizes this number and shows that an upward-sloping supply curve may be generated by 
country size differences:  the concealment price p must rise to induce larger countries to become 
havens.    In either case, we assume that any net imports or exports of capital between havens 
and countries are unimportant, allowing us to follow standard tax competition models by treating 
the capital employed per worker as fixed for the set of countries as a whole.   
The timing of events is as follows.   First, each country’s government chooses its tax rates 
and expenditures on tax enforcement.   Next, firms are formed, with capital moving across 
countries to ensure that a firm’s expected income, calculated net of taxes, labor expenditures, and 
expenditures on the concealment of taxable income, are the same everywhere.  This expected 
income is denoted r, which may be interpreted as the expected after-tax return on capital.  The 
realized return is random because investors do not yet know the value of their firms’ θ’s (e.g., 
tax avoidance may require legal research to be carried out by lawyers with uncertain skills).   
However, when making their investment decisions, investors correctly anticipate wages in each 
country and the opportunities for concealing income.   In the next stage, θ is revealed and firms 
purchase labor and concealment services.  Finally, output is produced and sold, taxes are paid, 
and the public good is provided.    
  Output produced in a country may then be written Kf(L/K), where the production function 
f relates a firm’s output per unit of capital to the labor-capital ratio that it employs, and country 
subscripts are dropped where doing so would cause no confusion.  The income earned by a 
firm’s investors before taxes are paid (or evaded) is given by the before-tax return on capital, R = 
                                                                                                                                                             
   10
f(L/K) – W(L/K)(L/K), where W(L/K) is the country’s equilibrium wage, which is declining in the 
labor-capital ratio.  Note that R is an increasing function of L/K.  Inverting this function yields 
the capital demand function, k(R), expressed per unit of labor.   With R and W both related to 
L/K, we can also define a factor-price frontier, W(R), which satisfies the requirement that 
equilibrium profits (output minus labor and capital costs) equal zero.    
Capital income is taxed at the statutory rate t, but a firm can lower the tax base, and 
therefore the average effective tax rate, by first incurring the “set-up cost,” θ R, which we take to 
be a fixed fraction of firm size as measured by income, R.
9   For each dollar of income, s(c, b) 
can be shielded from taxes by purchasing c units of concealment services at the cost pc, where b 
represents the government’s enforcement expenditures per unit of capital.
10  This function is 
increasing and strictly concave in c, and declining and convex in b, with s(0, b) = 0 and 1 > s(c, 
b) > 0  for all positive c.  In particular, some taxes are paid even when b = 0, although the 
amount may be small (costless “moral suasion”).
11  Finally, we assume that   b c / s ∂ ∂ ∂
2  < 0, 
implying that an increase in b reduces the marginal productivity of c in income-shifting 
activities, thereby reducing a firm’s optimal purchases of concealment services.  Unless 
specifically indicated, we will consider interior solutions for both taxpayers and the government, 
i.e., where b and c are positive.  
For a firm that takes advantage of this income-shifting opportunity, after-tax profits are    
    
 
                                                 
9 Making the set-up cost proportional to revenue R simplifies the algebra, because the subsequent purchases of 
concealment services are also proportional to R; however, our results are not sensitive to this particular specification.   
10 Equivalently, we could specify a cost function c(s, b).   Whereas firms are assumed to directly choose c in the 
current paper, a previous draft assumed that they chose s, given a nonlinear price function, p(s), designed by tax 
havens to induce firms to choose s efficiently.   The two specifications are effectively equivalent.   
11 This specification avoids discontinuities at b = 0, where s(c, b) goes to zero as c goes to zero for b > 0, but s(c, b) 
= 1 for b = 0 and c > 0.   We assume that s(c, b) is twice continuously differentiable.    11
  r ~  = R[1 –(pc + θ) – t(1 -  s - β(pc+ θ )],        (1)  
 
where the tilde distinguishes this return from its expected value, r, calculated prior to the 
realization of θ, and β denotes the fraction of payments to tax havens that is tax deductible, 
which is assumed to be fixed by law.  This fraction is meant to reflect the deductibility of 
variable costs under the U.S. tax code, combined with the possibility that firms may wish to 
shield some payments to havens from the tax authority, in an attempt to avoid detection.  Our 
main results will not depend on the value of β.   Without loss of generality, we assume here that 
income shifted to a tax haven is not taxed at all by the haven.    
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives.   As an example, suppose that s = c
γ, γ < 1, for a 
given b and a value of c in some neighborhood of zero. In this case, (2) implies that dc/dt is 










, ψ  > 0, again for a given 
b and small values of c.  For small values of t, we then have a corner solution, where c = 0.   But 
for any given t, no matter how small, we may choose ψ  sufficiently small to ensure that the 
chosen c is positive, in which case (2) implies that dc/dt = 1/p.
12    This last example suggests 
that the marginal deadweight loss from an increase in t can be substantial at low values of t, 
                                                 
12 We cannot choose ψ = 0, because then the integral defining c does not exist.   12
measured in terms of the resources “wasted” on tax evasion.  As we next see, however, few firms 
will choose to evade taxes at small values of t.     
By determining concealment purchases, (2) also determines the benefit a firm receives 
from participating in a haven—not counting the setup cost θ—expressed per dollar of income as 
follows:    
 
Θ = ts -  (1-tβ)pc.             ( 3 )  
 
This benefit determines the number of firms that participate in a haven.  In particular, all firms 
with  θ  < Θ  choose to participate, whereas those with θ  > Θ  do not.   Letting G(θ) denote the 
continuous distribution function for θ, the number of firms participating in a tax haven, summed 
over all countries, is  ∑ Θ
∈N i
i L k G * ) ( , where N is the set of countries. With each of these firms 
purchasing cR units of concealment services, aggregate purchases are C = cR ∑ Θ
∈N i
i L k G * ) ( .   
 Letting  α = G(Θ) denote the share of firms that shift income to havens, we may rearrange 
(1) and take its expected value to obtain the pre-tax return, R, as the sum of the expected after-tax 




    R = r +  T  + D
K,          ( 4 )  
  
where 
  T = tR(1 - α (s + β(pc + E(θ⏐θ < Θ)))  - b.         (5)    13
and 
D
K = R( α( pc + E(θ⏐θ < Θ))) + b,          (6)    
where E(θ⏐θ < Θ) is the expected value of θ, conditional on participation in a tax haven. The 
social cost of capital taxation per unit of capital, D
K, consists of government expenditures on 
enforcement, b, plus the expected costs incurred by a firm to evade taxes. Using (3)-(6), together 
with the optimizing behavior of taxpayers, we may define the functions, T = T(R, t, b, p) and D
K 
= D
K(R, t, b,  p).        
The costs included in D
K
 are social costs not only from the given country’s viewpoint, but 
also from the viewpoint of all countries combined, because they represent expenditures on real 
resources.  The cost of the investment distortion to the country is not included in D
K, because it is 
not a social cost from the viewpoint of all countries--firms that do not locate there choose to 
locate in other countries.    
For future use it will be helpful to invert the function T to obtain t = t(R, T, b, p).   By 
substituting this function into D
K(R, t, b,  p)  and using the determination of R given by (4), we 
may redefine the function D
K  as  D
K(r, T, b,  p).  The derivative,  ) , , , ( p b T r DK
T , is positive, 
because a rise in the effective rate T  requires an increase in the statutory rate, which induces 
more firms to participate in havens, and existing participants to increase their concealment 
purchases.   In addition, the higher statutory rate raises the before-tax return, R, which further 
increases D
K(r, T, b,  p),  because more income is subject to evasion.  Note finally that a welfare-
maximizing country will choose an enforcement level b to minimize D
K(r, T, b,  p).  In other 
words, it will choose the combination of t and b that minimizes this deadweight loss, subject to 
the constraint that t and b yield the chosen effect rate T.  In the case of an interior solution, we   14
may use the first-order condition, 0 ) , , , ( = p b T r DK
b , to define a relation between the optimal 
value of b and T, given the r and p faced by the country.  
To introduce labor taxation into the model, it is essential that we recognize the 
administrative costs involved in taxing labor.  If this tax could be costlessly collected, then 
governments would clearly prefer taxes on labor to taxes on capital, which distort investment 
and, in a small economy open to capital but not labor movement, have similar incidence.  Even if 
we introduced a labor-leisure distortion into the model, the labor tax would still be preferred; as 
shown by Gordon (1986) and Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), a small open economy should not 
tax capital income at source if a tax on (immobile) labor income is available, regardless of the 
labor supply elasticity.   If, for political reasons, government officials must tax wage and capital 
income at the same statutory rate, then they would have an incentive to allow tax havens to exist, 
thereby lowering the effective tax on capital towards zero.
13    
These arguments ignore the administrative costs involved in taxing wage income, 
including those associated with tax evasion.   Standard models predict that workers respond to 
taxation in the same way that capital owners respond in the model described above:  they incur 
costs in order to evade.  (See Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002, for a review.)    
Because our main focus is on tax havens, we use a reduced-form specification of the 
consequences of evasion of taxes on wage income that presumes implicitly that wage earners are 
willing to incur costs to evade and that governments are willing to incur costs to curtail evasion.  
Assume that taxing wage income at the statutory rate τ  implies an effective rate of Γ(W, τ) per 
unit of labor, and raises Γ(W, τ)L dollars of revenue, where the country’s labor supply, L,  is 
again assumed to be fixed.  This effective rate is defined similarly to the effective tax rate on 
                                                 
13 This is the logic underlying the “tax-havens-are-good” literature discussed in Section 1.   15
capital taxation, T(R , t, b , p), and has similar properties.  In particular, Γ(W, τ) is increasing in 
both arguments, with ∂
2Γ /∂W∂τ > 0 and  Γ(0, τ) = Γ(W, 0) = 0.  But, unlike our treatment of 
capital taxation, we do not explicitly model the enforcement activities that are expended in order 
to ensure that taxes are remitted to the government.  Rather, we assume that they are optimized, 
given the chosen values of τ.   Section 5 will generalize the model by recognizing the possible 
relation between the evasion of wage taxes and the statutory tax rate on capital income   
Tax evasion activities by wage earners, along with enforcement activities intended to 
combat tax evasion, create a deadweight loss per unit of labor, denoted D
L.   By inverting the 
effective-tax-rate function to obtain the relation, τ = τ(W, Γ), we may define a relation between 
this deadweight loss and the values of W and Γ:  D
L = D
L(W, Γ).  This function is increasing in 
W and Γ  at positive values of  Γ . To ensure some use of wage taxation in equilibrium, we 
assume that ∂D
L/∂Γ = 0 at Γ = 0.  The interpretation here is that a small tax rate on wage income 
(effective and statutory) creates no first-order incentive to evade taxes.  
 
3.  Equilibrium Tax Policies   
This section demonstrates that countries choose to tax capital, despite its mobility.  The 
optimization problem for a government consists of maximizing the utility of its residents, u(x, g), 
subject to three constraints.  The government budget constraint requires that the cost of the 
public good be equal to tax revenue net of enforcement expenditures.   Assuming constant 
returns to scale in the provision of the public good, this cost may be written gL, and the budget 
constraint may then be expressed, in per capita terms, as follows:  
 
g = Tk(R )  + Γ.         (7)   16
 
A resident’s budget constraint takes the form,   
 
x = rk* + W(R) - Γ -  D
L(W(R), Γ).           (8) 
 
The deadweight loss from capital taxation, D
K, enters this constraint indirectly by reducing the 
wage, W(R), through its positive impact on the cost of capital:  
 
  R  = r +  T  + D
K(r, T, b, p ),           (9) 
  
and the reduction in capital use due to the increased cost of capital.  In contrast, both Γ  and D
L 
directly reduce the income available to a resident for consumption, reflecting expenditures on 
income-shifting activities.   
Replacing x and g with the expressions given by (7) and (8), and using (9), yields an 
unconstrained optimization problem with T, b, and Γ as the control variables, which together 
determine the statutory tax rates, t and τ.  We have chosen to work with the effective tax rates as 
control variables, because doing so yields more easily interpretable first-order conditions.  The 
first-order conditions for T and Γ may be written in a form that equates the marginal benefit of g, 
ux/ug, to the marginal cost, MC
i, where i = T or Γ, depending on the method of finance.  As 
stressed in Mayshar (1991) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), in an optimal tax system the 
marginal efficiency cost of funds should not depend on how these funds are obtained at the 
margin.   In other words, MC
T = MC
Γ, assuming no corner solutions.  We make this assumption,   17
and later prove it. Throughout the analysis, we assume that enforcement b is optimally set, 
where 0 ) , , , ( = p b T r DK
b , for b > 0, as previously explained.   
The first-order condition for Γ is derived by differentiating (7) and (8) with respect to Γ  
to obtain the marginal rate of transformation between x and g, and then equating this quantity to 







Γ + =  ≡ MC
Γ.         ( 1 0 )    
    
Thus, the evasion of payments on wage income increases the marginal cost of the public good, 
MC
Γ, by an amount equal to the marginal deadweight loss from the higher effective tax on wage 
income, 
L DΓ . 
Whereas the taxation of wage income has no impact on factor prices W and R (because 
we are taxing a fixed factor), increasing the statutory tax rate on capital income causes R to rise 
and W to fall, so that capital continues to earn the after-tax return that is available elsewhere.    
To obtain the marginal rate of transformation between x and g, we may differentiate (7) and (8) 
with respect to T and take the ratio of these derivatives, (dx/dT)/dg/dT).  Equating this expression 
to the marginal rate of substitution yields the first-order condition for T:  
  






















      (11) 
   18
where ε = -k'(R/k)>0 , denoting the capital demand elasticity (measured positively), and use is 
made of the factor-price derivative, W'(R) = - k.    
Recall that in the standard tax competition model (i.e.,  where tax evasion is absent), the 
marginal cost of g, MC
T, exceeds the marginal resource cost (normalized to equal one) because 
each country treats as a cost the outflow of capital resulting from a rise in its tax rate on capital.  
This outflow represents a positive externality for other countries, in the form of capital inflows, 
suggesting that public good provision is inefficiently low (more on this below).    
But, when tax havens exist, (11) reflects the fact that increasing T through a higher 
statutory rate on capital income, t, makes concealment services more valuable to firms.  As a 
result, they respond by increasing their purchases of concealment services and hiding more 
income:  c and s rise.  In addition, more firms participate in tax shelters, so that α rises.  Finally, 
the resulting rise in the return R represents additional income that is subject to evasion, further 
increasing the amount of capital income tax evasion.   The marginal loss term, K
T D , reflects all of 
these effects. This marginal loss increases the marginal impact of T on the cost of capital, thereby 
contributing in two ways to the marginal cost of the public good.  First, it raises the capital 
outflow resulting from a rise in T, as shown by the term multiplying the capital demand 
elasticity, ε.    Second,   K
T D  appears in the numerator of (11), because the higher cost of capital 
is borne by workers in the form of a lower wage rate.    
In contrast, the presence of tax evasion in the labor market tends to reduce MC
T.  The 
higher T reduces the equilibrium wage, W(R), thereby lowering the deadweight loss resulting   19
from this tax evasion.   Simply stated, there is less evasion if there is less wage income.  This 
effect is given by the term  L
W D  in (11).
14      
Since MC
Γ = MC
T under an optimal tax system, we have   
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ε
=  L MDΓ + 1  > 1.            (12) 
 
This equality is now used to show that the optimal t and τ are indeed positive.   
 
Proposition 1.   Countries tax both labor and capital.  
 
Proof.  If  t = 0 initially (in which case T = 0 and b = 0), there are no incentives to evade capital 
income taxes, and so no firms participate in tax havens,  implying D
K = 0.   Since α = c = 0 
initially, the expression for D
K given by (6) tells us that marginal increases in t and R have no 
impact on D
K when t = 0.  Thus,  0 = K
T D in (11), where this derivative includes the rise in t and 
the resulting increase in R.  Because Tε also equals zero at t = 0,  the positive value of  L
W D  in 
(11) then implies that MC
T < 1 at t = 0.  Thus, MC
T < MC
Γ , implying that welfare can be 
increased by raising t above zero and reducingτ.   Under our assumptions, MC
T > MC
Γ = 1 if τ = 
0, implying that the optimal τ  must also be positive.  Q.E.D. 
 
                                                 
14 It appears to be theoretically possible for MC
T  to fall short of the marginal resource cost of the public good (equal 
to one), but this will not happen under an optimal tax system.     20
   The critical point here is that a small capital tax causes a negative first-order efficiency 
loss.  The first-order loss associated with a capital outflow, Tε, is clearly zero when evaluated at t 
= T = 0.  Previous examples showed that dc/dt = 0 at t = 0.  Even if dc/dt were positive, a 
marginal rise in t from zero would cause only a tiny number of firms to purchase a tiny amount 
of concealment services, and these firms would be the ones that incur a negligible fixed cost to 
enter the tax-haven market (i.e., they have small values of θ).  Thus, there is also no first-order 
loss from the evasion of capital taxes when t is raised above zero.  But by raising the cost of 
capital, this capital tax lowers the equilibrium wage, W(R), which reduces the amount of evasion 
in the labor market, creating a first-order efficiency gain.  For this reason, the marginal cost of 
the public good is actually less than one when it is financed by increasing t from zero.     
Looked at another way, a small capital tax must be beneficial because its depressing 
effect on wages represents a transfer of income from lightly-evaded capital income (due to the 
low t) to more heavily evaded wage income, lowering the overall deadweight loss from tax 
evasion.    
As capital taxation substitutes further for wage taxation in the financing of the public 
good, the efficiency losses from capital tax evasion and capital outflows both increase, causing 
MC
T  to rise and eventually exceed MC
Γ.  With (12) determining the optimal mix of statutory tax 
rates (given that b is optimally set at each t), we may define the marginal cost curve, MC(g, p), 
for countries facing concealment-service price p, where we hold fixed R and W(R) at their 
market-clearing levels (i.e., where k(R) = k*).    At low levels of g, this curve must be upward-
sloping, with increases in g financed by a combination of increases the two tax rates, as uniquely 
determined by (12).  To avoid possible anomalies resulting from violations of these properties,   21
we henceforth assume that they extend to the range of g considered in this paper.   To shorten the 
exposition, we also assume that b is positive, unless stated otherwise.  
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium mix of taxes as the intersection of the two marginal cost 
curves, MC
T and MC
Γ (ignore the other line for now), holding fixed g.  The horizontal axis 
measures the share of the given level of public expenditures that is financed with the capital tax.     
At the unique intersection, countries are choosing their optimal tax systems.   In Figure 2, g* 
denotes the equilibrium public good level, where the marginal benefit (MB) and marginal cost 
(MC) curves cross.     
 
4.  The Undesirability of Tax Havens 
We now demonstrate that tax havens are undesirable.  Our argument proceeds by 
eliminating tax havens and showing that, for two reasons, welfare increases.  First, each 
country’s residents directly benefit from the productive use of resources that were previously 
used for income shifting and tax enforcement activities.  Second, the marginal cost of the public 
good declines, inducing countries to increase their public good levels.  We shall show that 
competition for capital implies that the equilibrium public good level remains below the level 
that is optimal from the combined viewpoint of all countries.  Thus, eliminating tax havens 
moves the public good level closer to this optimum, increasing welfare.   
    
Proposition 2.   The elimination of tax havens raises the equilibrium level of the public good and 
increases country welfare.      
   22
Proof.   Eliminating havens does not alter factor prices R and W(R)  (determined by the 
equilibrium condition, k(R) = k*).    For a given g, however, the resulting efficiency gains raise 
private consumption, x.    
 But g does change.    If it remained at its initial value, then the rise in x would increase 
the marginal benefit of g, given by ug/ux, since g is a normal good.    But for a given value of T, 
the absence of havens would eliminate the marginal deadweight loss terms, 
K
T D  and  K
R D,  on the 
right side of (11), causing MC
T to fall (recall that R does not change).    Then, as shown in Figure 
1, the decline in MC
T would move its intersection down the MC
Γ curve, thereby reducing the 
common value of this marginal cost.  With the marginal benefit now greater than the marginal 
cost of public good provision, equilibrium would be restored through an increase in every 
country’s g, as shown in Fig. 2. 
To conclude the proof, we show that this increase in g in every country raises each 
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         ( 1 3 )  
given that both t and τ are optimized.  When all countries raise g by increasing these two taxes, 
no country’s capital stock changes, and so the wage rate also remains fixed.  Thus, there is no 
loss in revenue from capital outflows and no change in the deadweight loss from wage taxation, 
that is, the terms Tε/R and  L
W D  drop out of (13), lowering the marginal cost expression given by 
the middle term to one.  Countries therefore provide g at the level where increasing g by a unit in 
every country, financed with their chosen increases in t and τ, would provide a marginal benefit, 
ug/ux, that exceeded the marginal cost.  It follows that the positive impact of the elimination of 
tax havens on each country’s g raises welfare.   Q.E.D    23
 
  Proposition 2 may appear to run counter to arguments in favor of tax havens, which are 
based on a presumption that havens lower the effective tax rate on mobile capital, thereby 
reducing the investment distortions associated with a tax system that constrains income from 
immobile and mobile factors to be taxed at similar, or identical, statutory rates.  This argument is 
not relevant here, because we have endogenized the relative values of these statutory rates by 
allowing them to be optimally set in an unconstrained way.  A lower effective tax on capital can 
be achieved simply by reducing the statutory rate, and doing so is preferable to allowing tax 
havens to flourish, because tax havens raise the cost of collecting any given level of taxes on 
capital income.    
Even if we simply impose the requirement that capital and wage income be taxed at the 
same statutory rate, it might still be the case that eliminating tax havens is beneficial.  Given our 
assumption that taxes on wage income induce evasion, the optimal tax system involves some 
taxation of capital income, and so governments will engage in costly enforcement activities to 
collect this tax.  Eliminating havens reduces or eliminates these enforcement costs, but the 
resulting effective tax rate on capital is presumably too high when capital and wage income must 
face the same statutory tax rate.  These two considerations work in opposite directions, so in the 
political-constraint scenario we cannot say for sure whether tax havens are good or bad.  
However, the next section demonstrates that it is always desirable to eliminate some havens, and 
this result extends to the case in which all income is taxed at the same statutory rate.   
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5.   Partial Elimination of Tax Havens 
Partial elimination of tax havens raises some issues that complete elimination does not.  
In particular, if some, but not all, tax havens are eliminated, then countries are affected by the 
reduction in the supply of concealment services, because the equilibrium price of these services 
will increase (see Section 7).  The question thus becomes whether country residents are better off 
when p increases.  This section answers that question in the affirmative.   
To establish this result, we shall need to place restrictions on the form of the income-
shifting function, s(c, b), but these restrictions will enable us to demonstrate that the desirability 
of restricting the operations of tax havens extends to cases where wage tax evasion depends on 
the statutory tax rate on capital income.  Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) emphasize this 
linkage.  In their model, if capital income is not taxed, then taxpayers have the incentive to 
recharacterize and report wage income as capital income for tax purposes.  More generally, this 
incentive depends on the excess of the wage tax over the capital tax.  Gordon and MacKie-
Mason use this observation to demonstrate that the optimal tax on capital is positive for a small 
open economy.  In our model, the desirability of capital taxation is reinforced.   
This new feature is incorporated into the model by introducing the capital tax, t, as an 
argument in the deadweight loss function for wage taxation,  D
L = D
L(W, Γ, t).   In particular, 
this loss function is declining in t at those combinations of the three arguments that imply a 
statutory rate τ > t.  We shall assume that τ > t in equilibrium, reflecting the difficulties involved 
in taxing mobile factors.  For simplicity, we then assume D
L(W, Γ, t) does not vary with t in the 
(out-of-equilibrium) case where τ < t.  With the evasion technology thus generalized, we may 
modify the rule for the optimal t, given by (11), as follows: 
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where dt/dT now indicates the rise in t needed to increase the effective rate T a unit.   Equation 
(14) shows that the marginal cost of public good provision will be less than one when financed 
with a rise in t from some low level, not only because highly-taxed wage income is reduced, but 
now also because the rise in t directly reduces incentives to evade taxes on wage income.  
Turning to the income-shifting function, s(c, b), we now assume that it can be written as 
s(c/(γ +b)), where s(0) = 0, s'(
.) > 0, and γ  is a positive parameter.  For small values of this 
parameter, it is then approximately true that equal percentage changes in concealment services 
(c) and enforcement expenditures (b) leave unaffected the amount of income shifting.  To 
shorten notation, define B = γ +b, in which case we describe s(c/B) as homogeneous of degree 
zero in c and “adjusted enforcement.”  Then the first-order condition (2) of a firm’s optimal 
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With this additional structure, we prove the following lemma in the Appendix:  
 
Lemma 1.   For the homogeneous income-shifting function, if b > 0 in equilibrium, then a rise in 
the unit price of concealment services, holding fixed the after-tax return, r, raises a country’s 
welfare.   
     26
This result is easily understood.  By (15), the increase in p enables countries to reduce 
their enforcement expenditures, b, without causing the amount of concealment services to rise.    
Since b is financed out of the government budget, countries are then able to increase public good 
provision or reduce the wage tax.     
The behavioral response of countries to a higher p creates externalities through their 
impact on the after-tax return, r.  The proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix shows that the 
increase in p increases the equilibrium public good level by shifting down the marginal cost of 
funds curve, and shifting up the marginal benefit curve.  In Figure 2, the new equilibrium public 
good level is denoted g**.  Countries respond to the rise in p by increasing public good provision 
and their taxation of labor and capital, which drives down r.  In the standard tax competition 
story, welfare rises in every country because no country experiences a capital outflow when their 
taxes all rise by identical amounts.  Instead, r falls enough to keep the before-tax return R 
unchanged, thereby eliminating incentives for capital to exit any country.    
But when tax havens are present, the reduction in r may increase the costs associated with 
these havens.  In particular, the unit tax tR falls as r declines, requiring a higher t to offset the 
revenue loss.   But this higher statutory rate increases incentives to shift income through the use 
of tax havens.  As a result, it appears possible for welfare to fall as each country’s public good 
level rises above the equilibrium value.   In other words, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
the equilibrium level of public good provision is inefficiently high.  
Three factors work against this argument, however.  First, the higher t reduces the 
evasion of taxes on wage income (the Gordon and MacKie-Mason argument).  Second, if havens 
are reduced to a sufficiently small number, then the higher t no longer has much effect on tax 
haven activities, relative to the fiscal externalities that lead to public good underprovision.  Thus,   27
we can say that a large enough elimination of havens must improve welfare (assuming that b 
remains positive, as required for Lemma 1).  Finally, our previous examples suggest that the 
fiscal externalities leading to public good underprovision will in many cases outweigh the new 
“evasion externality” identified above, provided the capital tax is not too high.  In particular, 
recall our examples where dc/dt = 0 at t = 0.  In this case small taxes create no first-order demand 
for concealment services, and therefore no first-order participation in tax havens.  As a result, the 
efficiency losses from the fiscal externalities dominate those from capital tax evasion if t is not 
too high.      
Thus, underprovision of public good remains a relevant problem in economies with both 
tax competition and tax havens, and reducing the number of tax havens is beneficial because it 
increases public good provision. Using Lemma 1, we may then state:  
 
Proposition 3.   Assume the homogeneous income-shifting function, and consider an equilibrium 
where b > 0.  By increasing the concealment price p, a reduction in the number of havens causes 
all countries to increase their public good provision.  Provided tax competition leads to 
underprovision of the public good, this reduction in havens must raise welfare.   
 
As the number of havens is reduced, raising p, it becomes increasingly likely that a 
corner solution will be reached, where governments realize it is not optimal to pay for 
enforcement activities because the private costs associated with tax evasion have become 
sufficiently high.  In this case, our proof of Proposition 3 is no longer valid.
15  However, the 
                                                 
15 The proof builds on Lemma 1 by showing that an increase in p enables b to be reduced so that additional tax 
revenue is generated, without any changes in incentives to evade taxes, and a reduction in the marginal deadweight 
loss from the financing of an additional unit of g.  For income-shifting functions that do not satisfy our homogeneity   28
possibility that havens could be limited this much is perhaps farfetched.   We return to the issue 
of haven reduction in Section 7. 
 
6. Enforcement Expenditures 
Instead of attempting to control the number of tax havens, countries could instead 
coordinate their enforcement activities.  If public goods are underprovided, then mandating 
stricter enforcement might improve welfare in part by leading to additional public good 
provision.  However, such mandates would also affect the mix of taxes and enforcement used to 
finance the chosen public good level.  We next argue that the equilibrium mix is inefficient when 
the supply curve for concealment services is upward-sloping (i.e., p'(C) > 0).  In this case, a 
higher tax rate on capital or a lower enforcement level will increase the equilibrium price of 
concealment services by increasing the demand for these services.  We have already seen that 
this higher price raises welfare in all countries.  One country’s policy change causes only a small 
change in p, but this price change impacts a large number of countries, making its welfare effect 
non-negligible.  This “cost externality” is not found in standard tax competition models.  Here, it 
implies that countries finance their chosen public good supply with an inefficiently high level of 
enforcement, because they do not take into account that a lower level will, by raising p, benefit 
all countries.    
The next proposition provides an exact sense in which enforcement is inefficiently high.    
The assumption that p'(C) > 0 ensures that an increase in the demand for concealment services 
raises p, whereas the other three assumptions were previously shown to imply that welfare rises 
with p.    
                                                                                                                                                             
assumption, we would need to rule out the possibility that Proposition 3 is reversed by asymmetries in the incentive 
effects associated with marginal changes in p and b.     29
  
Proposition  4.    Assume that:  (1) the evasion technology implies a homogeneous income-
shifting function; (2) b > 0 in the initial equilibrium; (3) tax competition leads to underprovision 
of the public good; and (4) the supply curve for concealment services is upward-sloping.  Then 
countries enforce their capital tax collections too stringently.   In particular, if each country 
reduces the enforcement level b by the same amount, while adjusting its capital tax t to keep its 
cost of capital unchanged, given the equilibrium r and p, then p will rise and all countries will be 
better off.    
  
Proof.    Suppose first that that a single country raises the statutory rate t but then lowers 
enforcement b enough to keep T + D
K unchanged, thereby leaving the before-tax return, R, 
unaffected.  In this case, there will be no capital inflow or outflow and therefore none of the 
resulting externalities.  However, both the rise in t and fall in b induce firms to demand more 
concealment services, driving up the price. If we implement this policy change in every country, 
p will rise and, as we have seen, all countries will benefit from the higher price, through both its 
negative impact on the social costs of tax evasion (Lemma 1), and its positive impact on public 
good supplies.  Q.E.D.    
   
  The policy perturbation described in this proposition does not necessarily keep public 
good supplies fixed, because the proposition encompasses the case where increasing the tax rate 
on capital reduces evasion of wage taxes.  But we can then adjust the wage tax to keep g fixed, 
giving us a welfare-improving perturbation that finances the equilibrium level of g with less   30
enforcement.   In this sense, the financing of the equilibrium public good level is too 
“enforcement-intensive”.  
This proposition qualifies results in previous literature saying that governments compete 
for capital by reducing their enforcement activities (e.g., Cremer and Gahvari 1997, 2000), and it 
arises from cost externalities not found in the standard tax competition model.  If the supply 
curve for concealment services were completely elastic (p' (C) = 0), then these externalities 
would disappear, and so capital taxes would be collected using the level of enforcement that is 
socially optimal for the system of countries as a whole.   But our analysis of haven formation in 
the next section suggests that an upward-sloping supply curve is the norm.   
 
7. Country Size and Tax Havens 
We now model the formation of tax havens, in a way that generates an upward-sloping 
supply curve and explains why relatively small countries are more likely to become tax havens.  
The basic idea is that the costs incurred in becoming a haven grow with country size, whereas the 
benefit remains largely unchanged because a country’s productivity in the production of 
concealment services is unrelated to its size.   In other words, what enables a jurisdiction to 
provide concealment services (i.e., facilitate income shifting) is that it is a jurisdiction, not that it 
is a large jurisdiction. 
Consider the conditions for a symmetric equilibrium, under which all (non-haven) 
countries choose the same policies.  We continue to assume that each country is small enough to 
have no significant impact on the after-tax return r and concealment price p.   Thus, each country 
optimizes, conditional on these prices, and their optimal policies imply a before-tax return, R(p, 
r).  In equilibrium, p and r must then equate demand with supply in the capital market:     31
 
  k(R(p, r))  =  k*.        ( 1 6 )  
 
Given p, (16) determines a market-clearing r, denoted r(p).  Using this function, we may then 
define a single country’s per-capita demand for concealment services as a function of p alone, 
d(p).   Letting Yi(p) denote haven i’s total supply of concealment services, the market-clearing 
condition for p is:   
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where N is the set of (non-haven) countries and H is the set of havens.  
If countries are free to maximize welfare by choosing whether to become havens, then 
havens are formed until residents in the marginal haven receive the same utility as those in 
countries.  In a symmetric equilibrium, utilities are identical across countries.   Using the 
function, r(p), we let v
n(p) denote this common utility.  In contrast, we will argue that in some 
cases the benefit of becoming a haven falls with country size.  Thus, define v
i(p) as utility for 
residents of country i, if it is a haven, where country size increases with i.  If i* denotes the 




i*(p).         (18) 
   
Consider now the determination of these utilities.   Non-haven countries are free to 
choose any desired tax system.  Given the assumptions of constant returns to scale in private and   32
public production, along with constant returns in tax evasion and enforcement (as previously 
specified, for example), the optimal tax system does not depend on the size of the country.  Thus, 
the maximum value of utility is independent of country i’s population level, Li, in which case the 
maximized sum of utilities, Li v
n(p), is linear in country size.  
Suppose now that a country becomes a tax haven.    As a result, it lowers its statutory tax 
rate on capital to what would otherwise be an inefficiently low level, which in the prior analysis 
we have taken to be zero.  Ignoring for now the benefits flowing from the sale of concealment 
services, we may let v*(p) denote the new optimized value of utility, where v*(p) < v
n(p), due to 
the use of a suboptimal tax system.  Once again, this change will not depend on country size, 
given our constant-returns assumptions.  Thus, the total cost of becoming a haven is Li[v
n(p) - 
v*(p)],  which is linear in size.     
Those countries that choose to become havens receive a benefit from the sale of 
concealment services that depends critically on the production function for concealment services.  
We assume that each tax haven government provides an indivisible input, e (e.g., the haven 
“legal system”), which competitive firms (e.g., banks) combine with capital K
c and labor L
c to 
produce concealment services equal to c(e, K
c, L
c).    We shall next consider production functions 
that exhibit decreasing returns to scale, corresponding to  upward-sloping country supply curves 
for concealment services ( p'(C) > 0), and then we discuss the constant-returns case.   
If a country becomes a haven, then its cost of capital is R = r(p), because it does not tax 
capital.   Assume that decreasing returns limit the size of concealment production, so that havens 
also produce the private good.  Then the wage is given by the factor-price frontier for private 
good production: W = W(r(p)).  Thus, all concealment-producing firms will face the same input 
prices, regardless of the size of the haven in which they operate.  It follows that they will all   33
choose the same inputs and produce the same quantities of concealment services, independently 
of country size.  Decreasing returns to scale implies that this production of concealment services 
generates profits, which are also independent of country size.  The haven government may then 
tax these profits away, depending on the relative administrative costs involved in doing so.   
Profits that are not taxed go to the country’s residents.  In either case, the haven residents 
ultimately benefit from the profits that concealment-service producing firms make, and this total 
benefit is independent of haven size.    
However, in larger havens there are lower profits per resident.  In contrast, we have 
shown that the per-resident cost of becoming a haven is independent of country size.  Thus, it is 
the smaller countries that will choose to become havens.  Using the previous notation, we have 
v
i(p) > v
n(p) for i below some cut-off point i* that satisfies condition (18).  The world supply 
curve, p(C), is upward-sloping because a higher price induces larger countries to become tax 
havens.   This mechanism contrasts to the case of a fixed number of havens, where a higher price 
would simply induce existing havens to produce more concealment services.         
Decreasing returns may be interpreted as the result of the increasing difficulty of 
shielding income from tax authorities as the size of a haven grows.  In other words, we not only 
have decreasing returns at the individual firm level, as represented by the income-shifting 
function, s(c, b), but also at the level of a haven, represented by the increasing cost incurred in 
providing another “effective unit” of concealment services.  
If we instead assume constant returns to scale in the production of concealment services, 
then it can easily be shown that all countries are indifferent about becoming havens.
 16   As a 
result, the supply curve for concealment services is infinitely elastic.  However, this case has a 
                                                 
16 This result assumes that the input e is either costlessly provided, or the cost of its provision increases linearly with 
haven size.      34
property that seems counterfactual:  each haven specializes in the production of haven services, 
which it sells to countries in return for the private good.  This property may be simply explained.  
Since constant-return producers of haven services earn no profits, the benefit from becoming a 
haven takes the form of a higher wage.  But if havens also produced the private good, then they 
could eliminate haven production without altering the wage; immobile labor and mobile capital 
would merely be re-deployed to private production.  There would then be no benefit from haven 
production.  Thus the equilibrium price of concealment services must rise to a level at which 
countries specializing in haven services offer wages above the level at which private-good 
producers would break even.    
We close by relating this model of haven formation to our previous results.  Proposition 1 
clearly extends to the case of endogenous havens, because it concerns the tax policies chosen by 
(non-haven) countries.  In the constant-cost case described above, where all countries and havens 
have the same utilities, Proposition 2 implies that the elimination of havens makes everyone 
better off, regardless of whether they initially resided in countries or havens.  But with 
decreasing returns, residents of former small havens may be worse off, that is, the gain in 
country welfare may not be sufficient to compensate for the relatively high utilities previously 
received by the residents of small havens.     
Proposition 3 considers an exogenous reduction in the number of tax havens, with the 
resulting reduction in the supply of concealment services raising the equilibrium price of these 
services.  This supply reduction occurs in both the decreasing- and constant-returns cases (noting 
that havens specialize in producing only concealment services in the latter case).  We may 
assume that the initial set of havens is either exogenous or endogenously determined, as modeled 
in this section.  For the endogenous-haven case, Proposition 3 tells us that a sufficiently small   35
reduction in havens will make everyone better off and nobody worse off, provided the larger 
havens are eliminated first.  The largest haven did not benefit from haven activities, so it will be 
better off when these activities are eliminated and it takes advantage of the welfare gains 
associated with the higher p charged by the remaining havens.  But these remaining havens also 
benefit from this higher price.  Thus, everyone is better off.  This result provides a possible 
explanation for why international agreements might easily restrict the formation of havens by 
some small amount, whereas large restrictions are not feasible.   
Proposition 4 clearly extends to the endogenous-haven case.  If enforcement is reduced 
and the statutory rate increased, then the higher p not only benefits countries, but it is also clearly 
to the advantage of havens.  Thus, everyone in the world economy should desire less 
enforcement and higher statutory rates.    
Our analysis could be extended in various directions without altering the basic argument 
for why small countries become havens.  We could allow public inputs, e, to vary, while 
assuming that the production function c(e, K
c, L
c) exhibits decreasing returns in all inputs.  On 
the cost side, we might introduce costs other than those associated with a suboptimal tax system.  
For example, the “concealment industry” could be viewed as supplanting the production of 
intermediate inputs that enhance the productivity of private good production.  To the extent that 
this productivity loss grows with the size of the country, small countries would have a further 
advantage in becoming havens.   
   
8. Conclusion 
Unless territorial capital income taxes are dominated by other taxes, it is optimal for 
countries to devote resources to defend this revenue base.  Tax haven jurisdictions make this   36
more difficult by, for a fee, facilitating tax avoidance in the form of income shifting.  As tax rates 
grow, the incentives to pay such a fee also grow, aggravating the problem of tax competition and 
thereby putting further downward pressure on equilibrium tax rates.  Our analysis justifies 
concerns about the prevalence of tax havens.  We have shown that the elimination of havens 
makes all countries better off if they are not currently tax havens.  By explicitly incorporating the 
decision of a country to become a haven, however, we have seen that smaller havens may be 
worse off if forced to give up their haven status.  Whereas the elimination of a sufficiently small 
number of havens will leave all countries better off, the analysis points to the potential 
difficulties involved in eliminating large numbers of havens, including small ones.  A task for 
future research would be to explore ways to coordinate further reductions in tax havens.   
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1.  Applying the envelope theorem, we know that the impact of a rise in p on a 
country’s welfare does not depend on how the common values of b and t change, since they are 
initially optimized.  In particular, we may compute the welfare change by holding t fixed as p 
rises, and adjusting b in any way we find convenient; the welfare effect will be the same 
regardless of how we choose to change b.  Since (15) tells us that s and c/B stay fixed if  pB (and 
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The constancy of pB and c/B also implies no change in pc, and along with the constancy of s, we 
can conclude that the number of firms participating in havens stays fixed.  It follows that the only 
reason that the effective rate T changes is that enforcement expenditures decline (see (6)).  The 
resulting fall in T creates a surplus in the government budget, which can then be used to reduce 
the wage tax.  But with r
e and R unchanged (the change in b alone does not affect R), there is 
then a rise in private income, x = r
ek* + w(R)(1 - Γ - D
L), increasing country welfare.  Q.E.D.   
 
Proof of Proposition 3.   We need to show that the increasing p raises welfare.  Consider first 
the policy response described in the proof of Lemma 1, where b is reduced as p rises so that pB 
stays constant.  We know from the proof of Lemma 1 that T rises, only because b falls. As a 
preliminary step, hold g fixed by taking the revenue generated from the reduced enforcement 
expenditures and essentially throwing it away:  the lower b in the expression for T given by (5) is   38
replaced with b + w, where waste w is sufficient to keep T unchanged.   Despite this waste, we 
next show that the marginal cost of public good provision is lower than before and, therefore, 
countries have an incentive to increase their public good levels, holding w fixed.   Eliminating 
the waste w enables taxes to be reduced, further lowering the marginal cost of public good 
provision at the initial g.   Moreover, the lower taxes increase private consumption, x, which 
increases the marginal benefit of g, MB = ux/ug  (assuming g is a normal good).  As shown in 
Figure 2, the optimal level of public good provision rises to g**.  Under our assumptions, this 
greater provision improves welfare.   
Consider first the impact of the changes in p and b on the capital-tax-financed marginal 
cost of the public good, MC
T in (11). By (15), the constancy of  pB implies no change in c/B and, 
consequently, no change in income-shifting, s(c/B),  no change in its derivative, and no change in 
concealment expenditures, pc.  Again using (15), we can also conclude that the marginal impact 
of t on c/B and hence s will be unaffected by these changes in p and B.    Although the lower B 
implies that c will fall less in response to the tax-induced fall in c/B, the change in pc will remain 
the same, given the higher p.  Given these results, neither the number of firms participating in 
havens, nor the marginal impact of t on these firms, will change.  Collecting all of these results, 
we find that there is no change in the marginal cost of the public good if it is financed at the 
margin with a rise in the statutory rate t.     
On the other hand, the higher p means that a unit rise in b will increase the right side of 
(15) more than before, leading to a greater fall in c/B and therefore greater fall in s.  We may 
therefore conclude that the marginal cost of the public good is lower than before the price 
change, if it is financed with increased enforcement at the margin, holding fixed the statutory tax   39
rates. Let MC
b denote this marginal cost.  Of course, there is no change when the financing 





Γ.          ( A . 2 )  
   
The important implication of this result is that the marginal cost of the public good has not risen 
(assuming optimal financing), although the fall in b has generated additional revenue (denoted w 
per unit of capital above).  As explained above, this surplus in the government budget can be 
used to lower the tax rates, which further reduces the marginal cost of public good provision at 
the initial g, while raising the marginal benefit.   The resulting rise in the equilibrium g increases 
welfare.  As explained above, the higher g further increases welfare.   Q.E.D.  
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